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Evidence of an increase in various forms of inequality since the 1970s has motivated research 
on its relationship to growth and development. The findings of that research are contradictory 
and inconclusive. One source of these divergent results is that researchers rely on different 
group measures of inequality. Inequality by gender, household, class, and ethnicity may produce 
divergent effects on growth since they operate on macroeconomic outcomes via alternative 
pathways. Further, even within groups, the effect of inequality on growth depends on the 
measure used. For example, inequalities in capabilities (such as education and health status) 
may operate differently on growth than inequality in wages and income. This paper explores the 
different conceptual approaches to measuring between-group and within-group inequality and 
delineates the sometimes contradictory pathways by which these measures affect economic 
growth and development. The typology is applied to the cases of East Asia and Latin America. 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The effects of economic inequality have received a good deal of attention from development 
and macroeconomists in recent years. Interest has been fueled by the rise in inequality between 
and within countries, evident since at least the 1980s with economists concerned to understand 
the implications for development and growth. A good deal of ink has been spilled on this topic, 
but the findings of that research are inconclusive. Some results show, for example, that equality 
has a positive effect on economic growth. Support for that stance is not unanimous, and it has 
been shown that under some conditions, inequality is a stimulus to growth—or has no effect.  
One source of these divergent results is that researchers rely on different group measures 
of inequality. Inequality by gender, household, class, and ethnicity may produce divergent 
effects on growth since they operate on macroeconomic outcomes via differing pathways. 
Further, even within groups, the effect of inequality on growth depends on the measure used. 
For example, inequalities in capabilities (such as education and health status) may operate 
differently on growth than inequality in wages and income.  
This paper explores the different conceptual approaches to measuring between-group 
and within-group inequality, identifying the pathways by which these measures affect economic 
growth and development. In particular, it contrasts the short-run demand side impact of some 
kinds of inequality as compared to the longer run supply-side effects. This typology is applied to 
the case of East Asia and Latin America.  
With those goals in mind, the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
literature on growth and distribution of income by household and class. Sections III and IV, 
respectively, review the literature on two areas that have received less attention—ethnic and 
gender inequality. The impact of social exclusion and exploitation are considered, with attention 
to the different effects on growth of measures of capabilities as compared to income variables. 
Section V discusses the macroeconomic role of social hierarchies. Section VI presents a 
comparative analysis of measures of inequality, with consideration of how these correlate with 






II.  INEQUALITY, GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF 
HOUSEHOLD AND FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME 
 
Analyses of the effects of distribution indicate a number of pathways by which growth and 
development are affected.
1 Impacts vary, depending on the group measure of inequality.  I 
review the transmission mechanisms from inequality to growth here for two measures of 
inequality: household and functional. While researchers are often interested in making 
generalizations about the effects of inequality, the impact of this variable is mediated by 
institutions such as ethnic, gender, and political systems, which influence household structure, 
patterns of job segregation and resource access, as well as possibilities for political participation. 
It should not be surprising that growth effects differ, depending on the social and institutional 
environment. They also vary, depending on economic structure, as the next sections on ethnicity 
and gender suggest.  
 
A. Household Distribution of Income and Assets 
Recent theory and empirical analyses of the effects of household inequality focus on long-run 
supply-side impacts. Shorter run macroeconomic dynamics associated with inequality are 
elided, perhaps due to underlying implicit assumptions of full employment and smoothly 
adjusting labor markets.
2 Three transmission mechanisms from household inequality to growth 
are hypothesized in this literature: 1) effects on education and fertility, and thus labor quality; 2) 
social conflict impacts on macroeconomic policy; and 3) incentive effects on wealth holders and 
business owners, including on aggregate saving. 
 
Education/Fertility and Health 
The recent inequality-growth literature links inequality in wealth, proxied by income inequality, 
to underinvestment in education. This is attributed to imperfect capital markets, whereby credit 
and cash constraints prevent the poor from undertaking the efficient amount of investment in 
education. The result is underinvestment in poor individuals who exhibit higher marginal returns 
to investment. Ex-ante redistribution in this case stimulates growth (Galor and Zeira 1993).  
A plethora of studies, based on unitary models of the household, theorize a further link 
of income inequality to growth via the effect on education and fertility. Households with credit 





children (education). Because growth is fuelled by human capital investments, greater income 
inequality increases the number of poor households with high fertility rates and as a result, low 
rates of growth. 
A variant of this argument is that, in countries with a gender gap, parents will invest 
more in sons’ education than daughters' since their daughters are more likely to marry an 
educated man (Lagerlőf  2003). A result is high fertility because the opportunity cost of having 
children is low for women. This leads to less investment in sons’ education with the potential to 
drive the economy into a poverty trap. Many of these analyses have not been buttressed by 
investigation into gender differences that affect decision-making on fertility. I return to this 
topic in section III where I discuss gender inequality.  
  Inequality is also argued to affect productivity and growth via its impact on health status 
in countries. Numerous empirical studies confirm the link between inequality and ill health, 
although unraveling the causal mechanism between health and growth is complicated by the 
feedback effects of growth to health status (Knowles and Owen 1997; Judge, Mulligan, and 
Benzeval 1998). 
Inequality in other assets, particularly land distribution, can also negatively affect growth 
(Deininger and Squire 1998). This link is hypothesized to operate through the underutilization 
of land when ownership is concentrated and lack of incentives for waged agricultural workers or 
sharecroppers to make productivity-enhancing investments in land. 
Taiwan and South Korea are often cited as countries that instituted a land reform in the early 
1960s that led to positive growth effects due to the low food prices resulting from increased 
agricultural productivity.  
  
Social and Political Instability   
Social discontent and political conflict may result from inequality, transmitted to growth via the 
negative effect on investment due to heightened risk and uncertainty (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; 
Larraín and Vergara 1998). The security of property rights may also be called into question in 
severe conflicts.  
A link between inequality and poor macroeconomic policies has also been suggested, 
based on the view that the median voter influences macroeconomic policies. Inequality is seen 





investment, and slowing investment and growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini 1994).   
Despite the widespread attention to the potential for inequality to lead to social conflict, 
most theoretical models do not explore the conditions under which this might or might not 
occur.
3 Studies seem to contain an implicit assumption, if ill-defined, that inequality beyond a 
threshold violates norms of fairness, causing a backlash. Assuming this is the case, it implies a 
group identity in which members have a clear notion of the acceptable parameters of inequality, 
and the power to translate those group norms into collective action should income inequality 
become too extreme. This suggests that identity and power mediate the ability of groups to 
produce social conflict as a cost of inequality. Not all groups are equally powerful. Subaltern 




Inequality has been argued to produce incentive effects that affect long-run productivity growth. 
The various hypothesized links are contradictory, however. Most of the literature has 
emphasized the negative incentive effects of equality, with firms discouraged from expanding 
investment in the face of lower rates of return, leading to an equity-efficiency trade-off (Okun 
1975). Kaldor (1956) argued that a redistribution to high-income households where savings 
propensities were greater than in low-income households, would increase aggregate saving, 
stimulating investment and thereby growth. In both of these scenarios, redistribution to wealth 
owners is a stimulus to growth.  
On the other hand, Knell (1999) has argued that inequality can lead to low saving rates if 
concern about relative status dominates intertemporal consumption decisions. The result is low 
aggregate saving rates, with negative effects on investment and growth. This approach, based on 
theories of social comparison, emphasizes the impact of inequality on psychological well-being. 
Notions of fairness also mediate the effect of inequality. Earnings below a threshold of fairness 
can lead to reduced labor effort, lowering labor productivity and slowing economic growth.
4 
Inequality might also lead to a larger number of people engaging in illegal activities that 
threaten property rights, slowing growth (Fay 1993). 





growth. Forbes (2000) has found the opposite. In part this is due to the fact that while most 
standard regressions use initial inequality and its relationship to growth over a 25-year period, 
thereby assessing long-run relationship, Forbes’ specification captures short- or medium-run 
relations.  
. 
B. Functional Distribution of Income 
The mainstream growth literature has given little attention to the role of the functional 
distribution of income—that is, the distribution of income between wages and profits—in 
affecting output and growth. Nevertheless, this is an area of vibrant research amongst post-
Keynesian and neo-Kaleckian scholars.
5 Theoretical models are more varied, as they are 
designed to capture the stylized facts about economic structure in the countries under 
investigation. A number of models, for example, allow for excess capacity with quantity 
adjustments dominating price adjustments, and for imperfect goods and factor markets, with 
prices modeled as a mark up over unit costs. With these conditions, redistribution has both 
supply- and demand-side effects, which can be contradictory. 
Focusing on the impact of a redistribution to wages away from profits, three effects are 
identified. Wages are a cost of production, but also a source of demand, and can influence labor 
productivity. The net effect of these three impacts determines whether inequality is a stimulus or 
a drag on growth. 
The analysis of the effect on a redistribution to wages is straightforward: higher wages 
lead to higher prices or lower profits. The result is a negative effect on investment due to profit 
squeeze disincentive effects, and in an open economy, on exports, leading to economic 
contraction. Wages are also a source of demand, however, and if the average saving rate of 
workers is lower than that of capitalists,
6 a redistribution to wages lowers the aggregate saving 
rate and stimulates consumption demand. This can offset the negative effect of higher wages on 
profitability and investment.  
Historical growth accounts also emphasize the potential for higher wages to have an 
impact on labor productivity. Amsden (1992), for example, argues that late industrializing 
countries must compete with advanced economies by learning rather than through innovation. A 
fundamental component of this process is the adoption and integration of borrowed 





their intelligence on the production line in contrast to economies at a later stage of production in 
which productivity gains are largely induced by management and by engineers. 
Empirical evidence of the productivity-push effect of higher wages is provided by 
Marquetti (2004) for a set of 36 countries, and Seguino (1999-2000) for South Korea. The 
implication of these results is that within a band, higher wages can be a stimulus to productivity 
growth and can thus rise without disrupting profits or product prices since efficiency wage 
effects attenuate increase in unit labor costs.  
Higher wages may also push employers to invest in labor-saving technology in defense 
of their profits, raising productivity. Conversely, low wages can make firms “lazy” since 
competitive advantage can be obtained on the basis of lower wages instead of productivity 
enhancing investment under conditions of uncertainty. Seguino (2005) finds empirical evidence 
that downward pressure on wages can induce negative productivity effects, as firms face less 
competitive pressure to technologically upgrade. This may be a historically specific relationship, 
linked to globalization and increased macroeconomic volatility. Alternatively, employers may 
attempt to induce labor effort without raising wages so that unit labor costs fall.  It has been 
noted, for example, that equilibrium unemployment can be used as a worker discipline device 
(Bowles and Gintis 1990; Kalecki 1971; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). 
These short-run demand side macroeconomic disturbances can produce long-run growth 
effects. Particularly notable are hysterisis effects of prolonged unemployment (Darity and 
Goldsmith 1993; Roed 1996) and limits on the ability to import frontier technology that can 
slow productivity growth.  
These effects suggest that the functional distribution of income is a determinant of 
growth. Under some conditions, a redistribution of income from profits to wages can be a 
stimulus to growth. The conditions under which an economy is wage-led or profit-led (in the 
parlance of neo-Kaleckians) is influenced by the structure of the economy, the stage of 
development, external relations with the rest of the world, and class-based differences in saving 
and consumption. To the extent these transmission mechanisms carry weight, we should expect 
that the relationship between inequality and growth is not universal but rather is historically 
specific and influenced by a country’s economic structure. 
While the household distribution of income and, to a much lesser extent, the functional 





on growth—that is, along hierarchical or class lines—two types of inequality that matter for 
growth do not fall neatly into these categories. These are discussed in more detail in the next 
two sections. 
 
III.  RACIAL/ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
 
The social construct of race is a relatively recent phenomenon in human history but ethnicity, a 
form of group-based identification, has a much longer vintage. The cleavages along ethnic lines 
in recent years may be the reason that some economists assume that ethnic diversity almost 
inevitably results in social rivalry and conflict that has implications for the rate of growth.  
Easterly (2002), for example, argues that ethnic diversity, measured linguistically, can 
lead to conflict and slower growth. Politicians may exploit ethnic differences to cultivate an 
ethnic power base and conflict in order to remain in power. Ethnically divided societies, if 
spatially segregated, may also vie for public investment in their areas, leading to reduced 
investment in human capital of ethnically oppressed groups.
7 Indeed, Easterly and Levine 
(1997) argue that ethnic diversity in Africa explains low schooling, political instability, 
underdeveloped financial systems, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure in 
that region. Along these lines, Mauro (1995) posits that linguistic diversity leads to greater 
political instability and that this in turn leads to higher government consumption (as a means to 
assuage outsider groups) and lower growth. 
Another argument is that diversity increases the likelihood of rent-seeking behavior, 
which is in turn influenced by the “contest success function” or the probability of successful 
rent-seeking. With this in mind, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue for a conflict 
measure of ethnicity based on polarization rather than ethnic linguistic fragmentation. They 
develop an index that reaches a maximum at two equal-sized ethnic groups. The construction of 
the index directs attention not to the number of ethnic groups but at whether they view other 
groups as a threat to their interests. Homogeneity, on the other hand, is argued to raise social 
capital and trust and stimulates growth. The emphasis in this literature has been on ethnic 
diversity in Sub-Saharan Africa as an important cause of slow growth.  
Numerous studies fail to confirm the significance of racial diversity or find instead that 





effect of ethnic diversity in democracies, but determines that it reduces growth in a number of 
dictatorships.  
Many of the empirical studies suffer from a major problem in that the ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation (ELF) index itself is flawed. Darity (2000) and Cramer (2002) note, for example, 
that some countries are registered as linguistically homogenous (e.g., Rwanda), failing to reflect 
the ethnic tensions that led to genocidal violence in that country. Haiti, which has been wracked 
by political and social conflict, receives a score of 1 in the index (the lowest possible value, 
indicating linguistic homogeneity). And yet, Haiti is deeply divided along class and ethnic lines 
with the poor black Haitian peasants in conflict with the Haitian elite (mulatto and European).
8  
Rather than diversity per se, it is likely that a critical mediating factor is the distribution 
of income and assets between ethnic groups. Ethnicity becomes a social marker when used as a 
mechanism to assign access to and control over resources. Inequality of income can result from 
unequal access to property; discrimination that limits access to jobs (social exclusion); job 
segregation with “crowding” leading to downward pressure on wages; or out-and-out 
discrimination that results in wage inequality. Inequality in access to public resources, such as 
education, can further exacerbate inequalities. 
Unequal resource and income distribution can have several effects on growth. First, job 
segregation whereby subaltern groups are allocated the “bad” jobs (low wage, dead end, 
dangerous jobs with little authority) can reinforce social cohesion amongst workers and 
employers of the dominant ethnic group. The social cohesion of the dominant group may render 
oppressed groups unable to resist harsh working conditions, due to legal, social and 
psychological impediments to protesting. Examples include slavery in the “new” world, guest 
workers in Europe, migrant laborers in the U.S., and Malaysian workers in Singaporean export 
factories (Lee 2004).   
This last example points to a possible relationship between ethnicity and growth—that 
is, the segregation of less powerful ethnic groups into the worst jobs and/or those that generate 
foreign exchange. Indigenous groups in Latin America that produced primary commodities for 
export, black South Africans’ employment in resource extraction industries, and of course, in 
earlier times, new world slaves employed in agricultural production. Insofar as low wages 
resulting from group discrimination stimulate profits and result in low consumer prices, growth 





If, however, ethnic groups feel empowered and/or they form a sizable population, 
inequality can lead to conflict rooted in concerns about fairness. This is plausibly linked to 
negative effects on investment in cases where communal violence emerges (e.g., Sri Lanka, 
Rwanda, Gujarat, India, Guyana). This argument implies that ethnic heterogeneity, linked with 
ethnic income inequality, can potentially be a source of downward pressure on growth rates.
9 
In the longer run, ethnic inequality can lead to underinvestment in human capital of the 
subaltern group. Feedback effects on ethnic inequality are plausible whereby slower growth 
results in greater resource scarcity, ethnic exclusion as a means for the dominant group to 
maintain control over resources, and further underinvestment in human capital amongst 
disadvantaged ethnic groups.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Darity and Deshpande (2000) find that few unqualified claims 
can be made about the relationship between inequality and development. Numerous high 
income countries, for example, have wide ethnic gaps in income and capabilities, such as the 
United States, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. In those cases, the benefits accruing to 
dominant groups of ethnically based economic inequality have outweighed the costs for growth 
via social and political conflict. Why is this so? One possibility is that the minorities are so 
small in numbers as to not constitute a threat to social stability. The second, and this may be 
related, is that ethnic oppression has contributed to internalized racism, whereby oppressed 
ethnic groups accept blame for their low socioeconomic status, thus failing to protest inequality. 
These examples lead to a key question: How does ethnic diversity interact with the productive 
economy, distribution of assets and income, and social exclusion, coupled with ethnic/racial 
ideologies to affect growth? This question suggests the usefulness of a case study methodology 
for tracing effects of ethnic diversity to growth.   
 
IV.  GENDER EFFECTS ON GROWTH 
 
Theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between gender inequality and economic 
growth is in its incipient stage.
10 A key feature of the emerging field of gender and 
macroeconomics is the central role played by the gender division of labor, socially structured 
and as a result varying, but which universally results in differential bargaining power between 





important theoretical considerations for the effect of gender on growth.  
First, gender roles are not time and space invariant. Nevertheless, to varying degrees 
universally, women bear the preponderant burden for provision of unpaid labor to the 
household—the “care” or reproductive economy. Their role remains invisible because such 
work is ignored in national accounts, and yet that work is essential to the reproduction of the 
current labor supply and the production of the future labor supply. Labor is in other words 
produced, not exogenously given. Second, research in this area indicates that the household is 
not a unitary institution and instead, is the site of both cooperation, bargaining, and conflict.
11 
The gender balance of power within the household has significant effects on resource and labor 
distribution at the household level.  
With regard to growth theory, the implications of gender divisions of access to 
resources, labor segregation, human capital investments, and differential bargaining power in 
the labor markets and at home, is that short- and long-term effects of gender inequality on the 
macro economy may diverge, depending on the structure of the economy. I review the 
highlights of that research here, focusing on the work that sheds light on the relationship 
between gender and growth. 
 
The Household, Unpaid Labor and Non-Cooperative Bargaining 
The household is an important site for the distribution of resources and income, and the place 
where the future labor supply is produced (and the current one reproduced in the sense of being 
revitalized to maintain productivity). Who does this work and how household income gets 
distributed have repercussions for labor productivity.  The “new household economics” saw 
these decisions as determined in a harmonious way. Adult members were assumed to 
convivially engage in specialization in order to maximize household resources, and then 
equitably divide up the rewards of their labors between themselves and their children.
12 
Influenced by trade models, this approach views women as having a comparative advantage in 
caring labor, resulting in their choice to specialize in unpaid work while males specialize in paid 
work. Because income was assumed to be pooled, women’s lack of access to paid work was not 
considered problematic or the source of inequality. Further women’s performance of caring 
labor was considered to be a result of her “natural” endowments of empathy.  





the new household economics on its head, and suggests that the home is not always a happy 
place. Neither work nor resources are equitably shared, and instead are the target of negotiation 
due to conflicting interests between household members.   Bargaining power is influenced by a 
person’s fallback position—her or his next best alternative, should the bargaining fail to lead to 
an agreement (in this case, divorce or dissolution of the two-adult household). For women with 
responsibility for children, bargaining power depends on a variety of factors—access to outside 
income, divorce laws that protect the party’s access to marital resources, child support 
legislation that obligates the non-custodial parent to support children, and social norms that do 
not stigmatize divorce.  
Where women have more bargaining power, their preferences are likely to receive 
greater weight in negotiations over how to use family resources and labor. This is because their 
access to outside resources, should the outcome of negotiation be divorce, provides a more 
credible “threat,” making it more difficult for the male adult to impose his own preferences. 
Simply put, she has less to lose from divorce and he knows it, so he is more likely to cooperate 
and take her preferences into account. In the case where women’s bargaining power improves, 
the distribution of household resources tends to become more equitable. Indeed, the data 
indicate that when women’s income rises, which raises their bargaining power, household 
expenditures on children for health care, schooling, and food rise. This contrasts to male 
spending patterns with men spending a larger share of their income on luxury goods for 
themselves—e.g., cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. Improvement in women’s fallback 
position (such as higher income) also results in higher female to male sex ratios. This is because 
women are better able to direct family resources to children and, in particular, it seems, to 
protect their girl children. 
One case study in the Ivory Coast found that to achieve the benefits on children’s health 
and nutrition of a $10 per month increase in women’s income, men’s income would have to rise 
by $110 (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). This is because men spend a much smaller share of 
income on family. Likewise, in Mexico, a study found that men spend only 50% of their income 
on the family, while women’s share was close to 100% (Chant 1985). These findings are robust 
across countries.
13  
The policy implications of this are important. Efforts to improve family well-being are 





therefore income. Who earns the income in the household matters. Insofar as health capital and 
educational investments stimulate growth, we might anticipate that greater gender equity 
stimulates growth.  
One of the earlier insights of feminist research on gender and development was that 
macroeconomic policy makers treated the supply of reproductive labor as infinitely elastic—
assuming an unlimited supply of labor, with women costlessly accommodating any change in 
macro level policies. More realistic growth models would incorporate the evidence that labor 
supply is not exogenously determined but rather is a function of the gender distribution of 
earnings, resources, and power. Indeed, we can think of modeling the labor supply as generated 
by a “reproductive” function, one of whose determinants is the degree of gender equality.  
 
Gender Divisions of Paid Labor and Economic Growth 
The preceding discussion suggests that gender inequality can produce long-run negative effects 
on growth. However, gender inequality may have even more immediate effects on the demand 
side. These effects can be traced through their impact on macroeconomic aggregates—
investment, exports, and saving. I discuss each in turn.  
The gender division of labor permeates paid labor markets, with women slotted for jobs 
that are low-wage, of limited duration, and without a job ladder. Various reasons exist, such as 
women’s gender role as caretaker of children that limits time and flexibility for participation in 
labor markets; patriarchal norms that result in women being forced to quit work upon marriage 
in order to provide full-time unpaid labor services in the home; gender stereotypes about 
women’s capacities (sequestration in garment industries is often associated with the claim that 
women have more “nimble” fingers); differential access to education and training.  
The causes vary, as do the mechanisms used to segregate women into industries that, at 
least in the semi-industrialized economies, tend to be export sector jobs. The result, however, is 
almost as inevitable as death and taxes and that is that gender wage gaps are in evidence 
globally and a sizeable portion of those gaps is due to discrimination. The resulting gender wage 
inequality has been shown to be a stimulus to growth in semi-industrialized economies, 
controlling for gender differences in educational attainment (Seguino 2000a, 2000b).  
The transmission mechanism from low female wages to growth is via the effect on firm 





wages can also contribute to a country’s “comparative advantage” due to the resulting lower 
export price (Busse and Spielmann 2003; Osterreich 2002),
14 thereby stimulating not only 
aggregate demand but also foreign exchange earnings. At least for semi-industrialized 
economies trying to move up the industrial ladder, foreign exchange is required to finance 
technology imports—in the form of imported intermediate and capital goods or technology 
licensing. The countries most successful at this strategy have been East Asian economies, where 
gender wage gaps are some of the widest in the world. Many growth studies point to the 
equality of income distribution in Asia as a source of growth. But income distribution, which 
measures total household income, collapses data on and obscures gender inequality within the 
household. Countries with the widest gender wage gaps appear to be those with the most 
equitable distribution of household income. A scatter plot of income distribution, from the 
Deininger-Squire data set, and gender wage differentials (measured as the log difference of male 
and female wages) for Latin America and Asia makes this point visually (Figure 1).
15 Studies 
then that link Asian growth with equality are likely missing an important component of 
inequality that stimulates growth. 
  Gender inequality may also influence the level of aggregate saving, resulting from 
women and men’s differing propensities to save (Floro and Seguino 2002). Gender 
differentiated saving propensities may result from gender differences in responsibilities for care 
of children and perceptions of economic insecurity and risk. Women, for example, may prefer to 
save more than men to finance children’s education and for emergencies. They may also be 
induced to save more to smooth consumption due to their experience of volatile employment 
and weaker access to social safety nets. All of this implies that a redistribution of income from 
men to women will affect the level of aggregate saving with implications for output and growth. 
That effect depends, of course, on whether higher saving is a stimulus to growth, á la Kaldor, or 
dampens demand due to the negative effect on consumption.
16 
  As the preceding analysis suggests, gender inequality in the household and in labor 
markets can have contradictory effects on macroeconomic growth. In the short run, gender 
discrimination in labor markets reduces costs, stimulates investment and exports, and thereby 
growth (Blecker and Seguino 2002). But in the longer run, women’s unequal outside options 
relative to men can result in gender dynamics within the household that result in sub optimal 





In agricultural economies, these dynamics may differ, and gender inequality might have 
more immediate negative effects on growth. Darity (1995), for example, shows that the degree 
of gender inequality at the household level influences labor supply responses under structural 
adjustment. Women’s role as subsistence farmer, responsible for feeding children, can be 
affected, for example, by men’s control over female labor to work on cash crops. The result can 
be reduced household well-being especially for girl children, whose labor is sometimes drafted 
to substitute for the mother’s household labor. Limitations on women’s ability to shift their 
labor to the production of cash crops can hamper the labor supply response that is assumed to be 
elastic in many structural adjustment programs.  
A salient gender variable then is a measure of relative bargaining power between men 
and women, reflecting their outside options. Sometimes education is used, but the pervasiveness 
of gender wage discrimination suggests that a better proxy is the gender wage gap. The gender 
wage gap not only proxies for influences on household bargaining power but also is correlated 
with demand-side effect of gender inequality. I discuss both of these. 
  
Gender Educational and Wage Gaps 
Most variants of growth theory suggest that knowledge is a key component to increasing 
productivity and growth. While a host of studies have considered the effect of female education 
on growth, the role of gender specific educational attainment has been difficult to establish 
empirically. Earlier growth analyses found no effect or a negative effect of female education. 
Those studies suffered from specification problems that resulted in multicollinearity between 
levels of the male and female education variables. Recent work with a more solid theoretical 
framework solves this problem by including a measure of the education gap between men and 
women, controlling for the country-specific level of education. Positive effects of equitable 
education investment on growth are found (Hill and King 1995; Knowles, Lorgelly, and Owen 
2002).
17 The argument is that education raises women’s productivity, giving them the 
bargaining power to limit fertility
18 and improve children’s well-being.  
How do we reconcile the divergent results that inequality in wages is a stimulus to 
growth and yet inequality in education appears to have the reverse effect. While they might 
appear at first glance to be incompatible, on closer examination they are not. Education does 





they might be able to appropriate the benefits of higher education in the form of higher wages. 
But their lack of bargaining power holds their wages down. As a result, the increase in 
education benefits capitalists—in the form of lower unit labor costs, and thus higher profit—
which may stimulate investment and therefore growth.  
Further, productivity growth may also result in lower product prices, stimulating export 
demand and thus growth in an export-oriented open economy. Thus the combination of narrow 
educational gaps and wide gender wage gaps can be a stimulus to investment, exports, and 
growth in the short run. Tracing the longer run effects of this path are complex. As long as 
short-run growth leads to higher absolute per capita income but preserves gender inequality, 
household resources may suffice to provide for higher investments in children—albeit with 
gender gaps—that continue to stimulate further growth. The prime examples of this dynamic are 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
It will be apparent to the reader by this point that there are weaknesses in this analysis. 
Gender and ethnic inequality have been discussed as though they are separate phenomena. They 
are not (Saunders and Darity 2003). Individuals belong to a number of groups, some 
overlapping. The interaction of race and gender, or ethnicity and religion, for example, can 
result in different types of macroeconomic effects. In the case of Singapore, female Malay 
women are sequestered in low-paid export industries, and thus gender links with ethnicity to 
stimulate export growth through low wages. Educated Chinese women are not nearly so 
disadvantaged as young female Malay women—and indeed may benefit from that type of 
gendered ethnic exploitation.. But in South Africa, reliance on black men to provide labor for 
extractive industries, such as diamonds, suggests that ethnic inequality had strong effects on 
men, and black women were not affected in the same way, although clearly their well-being at 
the household level was strongly affected by the husband’s lack of labor opportunities. A more 
complex interweaving of how different group identities combine to produce unequal outcomes 
and macroeconomic effects is more attuned to a country-level analysis, and until more research 
is available at that level, it will be difficult to make cross-country generalizations. 
 
V.  THE MACROECONOMIC ROLE OF HIERARCHIES 
 





Williams (1987) notes, “Capitalism creates bad jobs, good jobs, and no jobs.” Ethnic and gender 
hierarchies influence the distribution of those jobs. That women and ethnic/racial subaltern 
groups are most often slotted for the lowest paid jobs or unemployment when jobs are scarce 
should alert us to the fact that growth is influenced by more than just household distribution of 
income. Indeed, such a limited measure may obscure other salient inequalities that have 
important effects on growth, both short- and long-term. Whether relegating some groups to 
lower rungs of the economic hierarchy will succeed in stimulating growth, it would seem, 
depends on a variety of factors, including their capacity to impose costs or resist marginalization 
or exploitation, not to mention the longer-run productivity effects on the labor supply.  
This implies that inequality is not an unambiguously losing or winning proposition in 
terms of its effects on growth. The potential costs of social and political conflict, 
underinvestment in children, and more generally, human capital must be weighed against the 
benefits of exploitation (underpayment of workers due to lack of bargaining power) and 
exclusion (unemployment shifted to marginal groups to limit social conflict amongst dominant 
groups).  
 
VI.  COMPARISON OF INEQUALITY MEASURES 
 
This section compares several measures of inequality, assessing the extent to which they overlap 
or diverge. I do this for a global data set, as well as a subset of semi-industrialized (middle 
income) countries where the role of gender and ethnic inequality is hypothesized to diverge 
from that in agricultural or mature industrial economies. Several data sets are compared: 
manufacturing wage inequality; household distribution of income; gender wage and educational 
gaps; and racial/ethnic wage and income gaps.  
Efforts to improve the quality of inequality data are well-known, beginning with the 
Deininger and Squire (DS) income inequality data set receiving a good deal of attention in 
recent years. Concerns about the sparseness, quality, and comparability of these data exist, 
however. The University of Texas Income Project (UTIP) has developed a new inequality 
measure, based on data collected by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO). Manufacturing wage data from UNIDO are used to calculate the between groups 
component of Theil’s T statistic for manufacturing wage inequality.





maintain that this measure of inequality is a useful replacement for income inequality measures 
based on household and expenditures survey, due to its greater availability and because, at least 
in industrialized countries, there seems to be a strong link between increased earning and wage 
inequality and income inequality. To the extent this holds, the UTIP-UNIDO data set provides a 
denser data set on inequality to facilitate empirical and causal analyses.  
Galbraith and Kum (2005) also use the DS data set to estimate gross household income 
inequality, computed from a regression relationship between the Deininger and Squire 
inequality measures and the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality measures, controlling for the source 
characteristics in the DS data and for the share of manufacturing in total employment. Their 
adjusted DS data set is also used in this analysis. 
 Several indicators of gender inequality are provided. These include three that measure 
gender gaps in capabilities (education gaps, life expectancy gaps, and population ratios).
20 
Gendered gaps in income inequality, which can also be viewed as a proxy measure of 
bargaining power differentials that influence household income, are captured by the ratio of 
male to female to male earnings. Gender wage gap data are available from the International 
Labour Organization and are supplemented by data extracted from individual country studies. 
In addition, I provide some preliminary data, extracted from a wide variety of sources, 
on racial/ethnic wage inequality ethnic inequality for a limited number of countries (11), based 
on Darity and Nembhard (2000) and supplemented by data from several additional country-level 
studies on ethnic earnings gaps.
21  
  For illustrative purposes, data on so-called ethno linguistic fragmentation (ELF) is 
provided as well as a newer measure, based on the ELF data set, of ethnic polarization data from 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). The ELF index can be interpreted as the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic groups as measured by 
language differences.
22 The polarization index, based on an underlying hypothesis about the 
determinants of group conflict, is a measure of the size of the ethnic minority relative to an 
ethnic majority. The assumption is that the closer in size the two groups, the greater the 
likelihood of conflict. This reflects the view that heterogeneity does not intrinsically lead to 
conflict; rather that potential is linked to the relative size of the ethnic groups. Neither of these 
measures directly measures income differences.  





earnings data suffer from sparse coverage, varying time units of measurement (days, hours, 
months), and of course, fail to capture wages in the informal sector, a problem that is 
particularly problematic when assessing gender wage gaps. This is because women are more 
likely than men to be employed in the informal sector (including in home working or 
subcontracting arrangements, where establishment size is small). The evidence suggest that 
informal sector wages are substantially lower than those in the formal sector, even for the same 
work, and thus it is likely gender wage gaps are wider than the official data suggest. Where 
possible, correction is made for hours of work. In most cases, data are for the manufacturing 
sector, but in other cases, the ratios are economy-wide earnings. 
With regard to ethnicity, these data combine both wage inequality and income inequality 
data, and as such, reflect some of the problems that the Deininger-Squire data do in terms of 
comparability. However undesirable this is, these data permit a preliminary step in developing 
an empirical understanding of the role of racial ethnic inequality in development and growth, as 
compared to other measures of inequality. 
Table 1a gives the correlation matrix for the various measures of inequality for 1998 or 
the nearest year (within 3 years), but excludes ethnic inequality, due to the limited number of 
observations which can distort the correlations. Table 1b gives correlation coefficients for ethnic 
inequality and the remaining inequality variables.   
 















Adjusted  Theil's T
Gender Wage Gap  1.00  0.09 -0.11 0.03 -0.14 0.07  -0.12  -0.07
M/F Population Ratio  1.00 0.58 -0.43 0.35 0.31  0.27  0.16
M/F Life Expectancy  1.00 -0.32 0.48 0.15  0.25  0.13
Gender Educational Gap  1.00 -0.26 -0.01  -0.30  -0.32
ELF  1.00 0.72  0.56  0.40
Ethnic Polarization  1.00  0.54  0.41
DS-Adjusted  1.00  0.87
Theil's T  1.00  
Note: n=68. DS-adjusted are Gini coefficients from the Deininger-Squire data set, adjusted for 
comparability and coverage by Galbraith and Kum (2005). Life expectancy and population ratio data are 
calculated from World Development Indicators. Data on gender educational gaps are derived from Barro 





correlations to make full use of the data on 138 countries, the correlations are qualitatively if not also 
quantitatively similar.   
 
Several features of these correlations draw our attention. The gender wage gap is not 
strongly correlated with any other measures of inequality. Nor is it closely correlated with 
measures of gender gaps in capabilities. The correlation between the gender gap in wages and 
the male/female population ratio is only 0.09, and with the male/female life expectancy ratio, 
the correlation is –0.11. Perhaps more surprising is that the correlation between educational and 
wage gaps is very weak (0.03). Assessing the influence of gender inequality on macro variables 
clearly requires a diverse set of indicators to capture the various dimensions of inequality that 
can affect growth outcomes. This is consistent with the divergent results obtained from cross-
country studies that assess the role of gender inequality in influencing growth (Section IV).  
  Also noteworthy is the weak negative correlation between the gender wage gap and the 
DS-adjusted and Theil’s T measures. Given that the household distribution of income collapses 
gender wage inequality, it is not surprising that there is little correlation between the two. 
However, that the gender wage gap is also inversely correlated with the Theil’s T, although this 
too is a weak relationship, is unexpected. Finally, note the much stronger correlations between 
the DS-adjusted, Theil’s T, and the ELF and polarization measures. All correlations are positive, 
and in some cases quite strong. Most empirical analyses of the effects of inequality on growth, 
using these measures, find evidence that inequality hampers growth, in contrast to the gender 
wage gap.  
 
Table 1b: Correlation of Ethnic Wage Gap with Other Inequality Variables 
    Note: n=11.     
 
  Ethnic 
Wage Gap
Polarization  0.41 
ELF  -0.002 
Gender Education Gap  0.27 
DS-Adjusted  0.13 
Theil's T  -0.23 






Table 1b gives correlations of the racial/ethnic inequality variable with other income 
equality measures and the educational gender gap. Because there are only 11 observations, these 
correlations should be viewed with caution. The strongest is between the polarization index and 
ethnic income inequality, while the correlation with the ELF is close to zero. The gender 
educational gap and ethnic income inequality are positively related but weakly.  
The ethnicity variable is weakly and positively correlated with the DS-adjusted measure. 
It is not clear why this would be so, although it is possible that a low correlation will result if the 
size of the subaltern group is small. With regard to wage distribution, the correlation is negative 
and slightly stronger. Because the Theil’s T data are for manufacturing only, the correlation 
between this and the ethnic income gap is influenced by ethnic patterns of job segregation. The 
correlation will be close if job segregation along racial lines in manufacturing is severe and the 
subaltern group is relatively large.  
In some cases, however, subaltern groups are excluded from manufacturing employment 
and for a variety of reasons are sequestered in other sectors of the economy, either due to 
outright discrimination or due to underinvestment in social infrastructure that impedes their 
ability to compete in labor markets An example is indigenous populations in Latin America, 
employed (and often marginalized) in the agricultural sector, unable to compete in a variety of 
manufacturing sector jobs. In those cases, the Theil’s T measure is unlikely to show a strong 
correlation with ethnic inequality.  
Interestingly, the gender wage gap and ethnic wage gap show a pronounced negative 
correlation (see also Figure 2). This may reflect a pattern whereby in ethnically diverse 
societies, ethnically-based exploitation and marginalization substitutes for such gendered 
practices, with subaltern groups providing least-cost labor that stimulates investment and 
exports. In ethnically homogenous societies, gender power imbalances can result in women 
being allocated to the low rung of the economic ladder (Darity 2002, 2005; Seguino 2000a). 
While the data are minimal and not of high quality, there is some indication that gender and 
ethnicity play similar roles in the macroeconomy, depending on the ethnic make-up of the 
society. A more complete data set would be needed to fully investigate this premise.  
In Figure 3, panels A-D provide visual representations, based on scatter plots, of the 





the adjusted DS data set and Theil’s T from the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality data set. Panel A 
makes clear the absence of a correlation between gender wage gaps and household income 
inequality. Studies attempting to discern the impact of inequality on growth and development 
clearly miss the gender component if they rely on the DS data set. The correlation coefficient on 
Theil’s T and the gender wage gap in Table 1 is negative and very low, and the graphical 
representation confirms this is an inverse relationship (Panel B), although clearly, a wide range 
of gender wage gaps coexist with any particular Theil’s T measure of income inequality, 
suggesting this is also a poor proxy for gender inequality. 
Panels C and D are scatter plots of the ethnic earnings gap with the DS-adjusted Ginis 
and the Theil’s T. Similarly, these measures give little evidence of being correlated with the 
ethnic earnings gap, although in the Theil’s T case, the correlation appears to be negative—in 
countries with greater pay equity in manufacturing, the ethnic earnings gaps are narrower. 
 
Inequality in Semi-Industrialized Economies 
The previous sections underscored that the relationship between inequality and growth depends 
on the structure of the economy, which interacts with patterns of job segregation by ethnicity 
and gender. Further, the form of that inequality is likely to differ, ranging from wage 
discrimination and thus inequality to exclusion in the form of high relative unemployment rates. 
The clearest links that have been developed in the literature are in semi-industrialized 
economies along gender lines, and I would like to turn to that analysis here.  
Table 2 presents inequality correlations for semi-industrialized economies. In particular 
it is useful to focus on the correlation between income inequality and gender wage gaps. The 
low inequality countries in this sample are in East Asia, the region that also has the widest 
gender wage gaps. There is a clear inverse relationship between the two measures. Note the 
strong inverse relationship between the gender wage gap and the gender educational attainment 
gap for this set of countries—precisely the opposite of what would be anticipated if women 





















Gender Wage Gap 1.00 0.46 0.30 -0.62 -0.17 -0.33 -0.37 -0.24
M/F Population Ratio 1.00 0.57 -0.59 0.29 -0.01 -0.17 0.00
M/F Life Expectancy 1.00 -0.23 0.48 0.01 0.07 0.01
Gender Educational Gap 1.00 -0.19 0.16 -0.04 -0.12
ELF 1.00 0.61 0.52 0.36
Ethnic Polarization 1.00 0.44 0.44
DS-Adjusted 1.00 0.89
Theil's T 1.00  
Note: n=28. 
 
This suggests that analyses of growth in East Asia may erroneously lay success at the 
doorstep of income equality when gender inequality is in fact a determining factor. It is also 
conceivable that household equality that results in more resources for poor households (through 
male wages) to invest in education is compatible with gender inequality. 
Figure 4 gives a visual representation of these correlations, and indicates an obvious 
negative relationship between the more commonly used Gini and the gender wage gap of this set 
of countries. I do not attempt to consider ethnic earnings gap here because of the even smaller 
size of that sample.  
For associational purposes, I provide some basic growth regression results here, modeled 
after Barro and others. The problems with cross-country regressions are well-known, including 
problems of omitted variable bias. With that caveat in mind, these results should be viewed with 
some caution. 
The regressions are for two time periods, 1975-99 and 1990-99. Independent variables 
are standards—investment share of GDP, initial educational attainment, and the log of initial per 
capita GDP.
24 I successively add inequality variables to these. Those variables are measured as 
averages for the period in question, although in many cases, there are missing data.   
Equation 1 in Table 3 is the baseline regression for 1975-99. Variables have expected 
signs although the coefficient on investment as a share of GDP is not significant. Equation 2 
adds in the DS-adjusted Gini coefficients and the polarization index while dropping the initial 
education variables which are collinear with the DS-adjusted measure. Variables again have the 





negative effect on growth, as hypothesized in much of the literature. In equation 3, I add the 
gender wage and educational gaps. Only the wage gap variable is significant, and it is positive, 
indicating that an increase in gender wage inequality is a stimulus to growth, even after 
controlling for household inequality.  
Equation 4 repeats this regression for the period 1990-99. Those results indicate that the 
household equality no longer has a salutatory effect on growth, while the gender wage gap 
continues to exert a negative effect on growth, albeit with marginal statistical significance. The 
negative effect is, however, notably larger in this period. Figure 5 presents partial correlations of 
growth and the gender wage gap using a LOESS process of nearest neighborhood fit.  In the 
period 1975-99, it is notable that the curve becomes steeper as the gender wage gap rises.    
 
 
Table 3. OLS Regression Results: Growth and Inequality 
Dependent Variable: Total Change Per Capita GDP  
  ________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ___________1975-99_______   1990-99 
  Eq. 1        Eq. 2     Eq. 3      Eq. 4 
_________________________________________________________________________________                   
Constant     0.566       2.919  3.095    -0.071 
    (2.01)**      (3.98)***  (2.61)**  (0.12)   
Initial GDP   -0.104      -0.061  -0.068    0.015 
      (2.29)**       (1.20)  (0.95)    (0.58)   
Initial Investment 0.060         -0.005  -0.081    0.005 
      (0.81)         (0.53)  (0.64)    (1.18) 
Initial Education  0.313         -0.013         
      (3.05)***      (0.10) 
Polarization            -0.295  -0.233    -0.047 
               (1.30)  (0.91)    (0.44) 
Gini             -0.040  -0.042    0.001 
               (3.45)***  (2.36)*   (0.13) 
Education Gap            -0.258    -0.103 
         (0.59)   (0.68) 
Wage  Gap          0.009   0.216 
         (2.68)***  (1.67)* 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
  N               81        63          49         51 
Adj. R
2           0.083   0.244                0.263                 0.059                 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. A triple asterisk 







VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the impact of gender and ethnic inequality on economic growth, and 
suggests, in contrast to recent research, that inequality along these lines can be a stimulus to 
growth. These inequality effects, measured as earnings and income gaps, are transmitted to 
investment and exports, producing positive demand side effects. Longer-run effects of ethnicity 
and gender inequality may very well be negative, due to the potential repercussions on social 
discontent and conflict, possible deleterious effects on children’s capabilities, and the reduced 
pressure on firms to innovate. Long-run effects then are more likely to be negative, while short- 
and medium term effects—at least of gender and ethnic inequality—appear to be positive.  
Some empirical evidence is also provided that suggests that different measures of 
inequality can be working in opposite directions. In particular, measures of household or pay 
inequality weakly or inversely correlated with a number of measures of gender and racial/ethnic 
inequality. Household income data, in particular, fails to capture gender inequality because that 
data collapses household income. A number of countries assumed to have very equitable 
distributions of household income have wide gender wage gaps, suggesting that empirical 
growth analyses that rely only on household income inequality fail to identify an important 
source of inequality and its relationship to growth. Previous research and a brief empirical 
growth accounting exercise presented here find that gender wage inequality can be a stimulus to 
economic growth, even while gender educational inequality has a negative effect.  
The results may appear contradictory, making it difficult to make universal claims about 
the role of inequality. What is apparent, however, is that some kinds of inequality under some 
conditions are a stimulus to growth, while other types of inequality, again under certain 
conditions, reduce the rate of growth. In fact, it is clear that countries with high inequality (of 
some kinds) can grow rapidly while others with low inequality can also grow rapidly. This 
suggests that countries have some leeway in choosing the type of society they wish to pursue.  
While there seems little doubt that recent efforts to explore the effects of inequality on 
growth are motivated by an instrumentalist desire to argue the merits of reducing inequality, the 
reality is that inequity can pay, under some conditions. Efforts to sweep that sad fact under the 
carpet are understandable. But equity can also pay, under some conditions, as the evidence of 





structural and institutional mechanisms as well as macro policies by which we can make growth 






































































































































































































                              
Figure 1 
LAC and Asia: 










































































Panel  A         Panel  B 
 
Full Sample: DS-Adjusted Gini 





























       
 
 Panel C                   Panel D 
Full Sample: DS-Adjusted Gini  





























Full Sample: Theil's T and  
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Semi-Industrialized Economies:  
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1 I focus discussion in this paper on growth effects of inequality, but a useful extension of this inquiry is 
into the well-being effects of inequality. 
 
2 This seems rather odd since inequality that affects the level of aggregate demand has implications for 
firm investment (in response to a change in sales) with longer run growth implications. 
 
3 Sociologists and political scientists have, however, done a good deal of research on this. As an 
example, see Brysk and Wise (1997), who note that institutional opportunities for expressing discontent 
and for channeling economic demands can mitigate violence. Where those options are closed off, and 
where the state is unable or unwilling to provide a social safety net to cushion surges in inequality and 
economic crisis, inequality is more likely to lead to conflict. They apply this analysis to the cases of 
Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico. 
 
4 The effects of a threatening environment also affect productivity, whereby such environments activate 
our social identity and the negative stereotypes associated with them. There is significant evidence of this 
phenomenon affecting academic performance, and contributing to feelings of self-doubt and belonging. 
Such undermining of self-esteem can lead social groups to accept their low wages as justified. But it can 
also lead to low productivity, given the negative psychological effects of harmful stereotypes. See 
Inzlicht and Good (forthcoming).  
 
5 See, for example, Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), Dutt (1984, 1990), Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), and 
Taylor (1991). 
 
6 Capitalists’ saving propensity is determined by desire to internally finance new investment and as a 
means to signal creditworthiness. 
 
7 In contrast, in Trinidad and Tobago, a multi-ethnic society, the two dominant ethnic groups—Indo and 
Afro Trinidadians are not spatially segregated. Perhaps for this reason, public school spending is not 
differentially available to the two groups. This suggests the usefulness of a greater emphasis on linking 
ethnic diversity to spatial segregation rather than linguistic diversity. 
 
8 Linguistic differences do exist in Haiti insofar as poor Haitians speak only Haitian Creole, while the 
elite  speak French (and often refuse to admit that they also speak Creole). The ethnic linguistic 
fragmentation index however fails to pick this up.  
 
9 See also Brysk and Wise (1997) on South America, Cramer (2002) on Rwanda and Angola, Ndikumana 
(1998) on Burundi.  
 
10 See, for example, Braunstein (2000), Blecker and Seguino (2002), Darity (1995), Erturk and Darity 
(2000), Floro and Seguino (2002), Cagatay (2003). 
 
11 The theoretical work in this area is extensive. See, for example, Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy 
and Horney (1981), Bolin (1997), Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1997), Basu and Bechtold (1998). 
 








                                                                                                                                                            
13 For a sample of studies that find similar results, see Agarwal (1997), Bruce and Dwyer (1988), 
Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1998), and Kabeer (1994). 
 
14 In essence, low female wages are analogous to a currency devaluation in terms of their effect on 
relative prices. 
 
15  The data on which this figure is based are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
16 For the latter to occur, women as workers would have to consume more out of income than capitalists. 
 
17 Boschini (2003) argues that gender-specific educational attainment choices have macroeconomic 
consequences for growth. In particular, gender norms that channel women to some fields such as 
humanities and men to others (e.g., sciences) can result in efficiency losses, given that biological 
evidence indicates that ability between genders is smaller than ability differences within genders. 
Consequently,  gender norms cause some men and women to bypass those fields for which they have the 
greatest ability. Using a measure of norms based on occupational segregation, Boschini finds that such 
stereotypes inhibit economic growth in a cross section of countries. 
  
18 This isn’t always a conflictual negotiation between men and women in the household, since higher 
education raises the opportunity cost of more children, and conceivably men will agree that paid work is 
a better option not only for women but also for the household. Nevertheless, substantial evidence 
suggests that because outside work raises women’s bargaining power in the household and undermines 
male breadwinner norms and power, men resist women’s participation in the labor force. Thus, fertility 
decisions are themselves subject to negotiation, influenced by bargaining power. 
 
19 The UTIP-UNIDO data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
 
20 For ease of comparison, these are measured that larger values indicate increases in  income inequality. 
So, for example, educational gaps are measured as the log rhythmic difference of male and female total 
average years of educational attainment for those 15 and older. Likewise, population gaps are measured 
as male relative to female population. On population ratios as a measure of gender inequality, see Sen 
(1990).  
 
21 Some might look askance at using raw earnings differentials, not corrected for differences in 
productivity. The gaps in productivity themselves, however, are an indication of discrimination and 
ethnic inequality (that is, they reflect both pre- and within-market discrimination, and as such, raw ratios 
are a more accurate measure of inequality. 
 
22 Data were compiled in the 1960s and Taylor and Hudson (1972) used this to develop the ELF index. 
 
23 See Appendix for full and semi-industrialized economy samples. 
 
24 Data on investment and GDP are from the World Development Indicators, while education data are 
from the Barro and Lee (2000) international education data set. 